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ABSTRACT This paper reexamines the implications for monetary policy of
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates in light of recent experience.
The ZLB contributed little to the sharp output declines in many economies in
2008, but it is a significant factor slowing recovery. Model simulations imply
that an additional 4 percentage points of rate cuts would have limited the rise
in the U.S. unemployment rate and would bring unemployment and inflation
more quickly to steady-state values, but the ZLB precludes these actions, at a
cost of $1.8 trillion in forgone U.S. output over four years. If recent events
presage a shift to a significantly more adverse macroeconomic climate, then
2 percent steady-state inflation may provide an inadequate buffer against the
ZLB, assuming a standard Taylor rule. Stronger countercyclical fiscal policy
or alternative monetary policy strategies could mitigate the ZLB’s effects, but
even with such policies an inflation target of 1 percent or lower could entail
significant costs.
Icarus, my son, I charge you to keep at a moderate height, for if you fly too low the damp
will clog your wings, and if too high the heat will melt them.
—Bulfinch’s Mythology, Chapter XX
Japan’s sustained deflation and near-zero short-term interest rates begin-ning in the 1990s prompted an outpouring of research on the implications
of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates for monetary policy
and the macroeconomy. In the presence of nominal rigidities, the ZLB will
at times constrain the central bank’s ability to reduce nominal, and thus real,
interest rates in response to negative shocks to the economy. This inability
to reduce real rates as low as desired impairs the ability of monetary policy
to stabilize output and inflation. The quantitative importance of the ZLB
depends on how often and how tightly the constraint binds, a key determi-
nant of which is the steady-state inflation rate targeted by the central bank.
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If that rate is sufficiently high, the ZLB will rarely impinge on monetary
policy and the macroeconomy. If sufficiently low, the ZLB may have more
deleterious effects. All else equal, then, the presence of the ZLB argues for
a higher steady-state inflation rate.
Of course, not all else is equal. Since Martin Bailey (1956), econo-
mists have identified and studied other sources of distortions related 
to inflation besides the ZLB. Several of these—including transactions
costs, real distortions associated with nonzero rates of inflation, and non-
neutralities in the tax system—argue for targeting steady-state inflation
rates of zero or below. Others—including asymmetries in wage setting,
imperfections in labor markets, distortions related to imperfect competi-
tion, and measurement bias—argue for positive steady-state inflation
(see, for example, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 1996). Balancing these
opposing influences, central banks around the globe have sought to heed
the mythical Greek inventor Daedalus’s advice to his son by choosing an
inflation goal neither too low nor too high. In practice, many central
banks have articulated annual inflation goals centered on 2 to 3 percent
(Kuttner 2004). Simulations of macroeconomic models where monetary
policy follows a version of the Taylor (1993) rule indicate that with an
inflation target of 2 percent, the ZLB will act as a binding constraint on
monetary policy relatively frequently (Reifschneider and Williams 2000;
Billi and Kahn 2008). But these simulations also predict relatively mod-
est effects of the ZLB on macroeconomic volatility with a 2 percent tar-
get, because the magnitude of the constraint will be relatively small and
its duration relatively brief. Only with inflation targets of 1 percent or
lower does the ZLB engender significantly higher variability of output
and inflation in these simulations. In summary, these studies find a 2 per-
cent inflation target to be an adequate buffer against adverse effects aris-
ing from the ZLB.
The economic tumult of the past two years, with short-term interest rates
near zero in most major industrial economies, has challenged this conclu-
sion. As figure 1 shows, the global financial crisis and ensuing recession
have driven many major central banks to cut their short-term policy rates
effectively to zero; other central banks constrained by the ZLB include the
Swedish Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank. Despite these aggressive
monetary policy actions, and despite considerable stimulus from fiscal pol-
icy, these economies are suffering their worst downturns in many decades
(figure 2). In addition, fears of deflation have intensified as falling com-
modity prices and growing economic slack put downward pressure on prices
generally. As figure 3 shows, overall consumer price index (CPI) inflation
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Figure 1. Central Bank Policy Rates in Major Industrial Countries, 2003–09 and
Forecast 2009–10a
Figure 2. Real GDP in Major Industrial Countries, 2007–09 and Forecast 2009–11a
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis data; Consensus Economics, “Consensus Forecasts,” Septem-
ber 2009; European Central Bank data; Haver Analytics; authorís calculations.
a. Faded lines are projections based on the September 2009 “Consensus Forecasts.”
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has fallen sharply in all major industrial economies. Much of this decline
is due to falling commodity prices, especially energy prices, but core mea-
sures of CPI inflation have come down in these economies over the past
year as well.
Given these conditions, a strong case can be made for the desirability
of additional monetary stimulus in the United States and in many other
countries. But with rates already effectively at zero, this is not an option, at
least in terms of conventional monetary actions. Several central banks have
therefore taken unconventional measures, such as changes in the composition
and size of the asset side of their balance sheets. But the short- and long-term
effects of these unconventional policies remain highly uncertain, and in
any case such policies are at best imperfect substitutes for standard interest
rate cuts.
This paper examines the effects of the ZLB on the current recession and
reevaluates the expected future effects associated with the ZLB and the
optimal inflation rate in light of new information and research.1 There are
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1. I do not examine the issues related to multiple equilibria studied by Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohé, and Uribe (2001). Instead, like Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008), I assume that
discretionary fiscal policy will intervene to ensure that a unique steady state exists toward
which the economy tends to revert.
Figure 3. Inflation in Major Industrial Countries, 2003–09 and Forecast 2010–11a
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis data; Consensus Economics, “Consensus Forecasts,” Septem-
ber 2009; European Central Bank data; Haver Analytics; author’s calculations.
a. Faded lines are projections based on the September 2009 “Consensus Forecasts.”
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two main findings. First, the ZLB did not materially contribute to the sharp
declines in output in the United States and many other economies through
the end of 2008, but it is a significant factor slowing their recovery. Model
simulations for the United States imply that an additional 4 percentage points
of interest rate cuts would have kept the unemployment rate from rising as
much as it has and would bring the unemployment and inflation rates more
quickly to their steady-state values, but the ZLB precludes these actions.
This inability to lower interest rates comes at a cost of about $1.8 trillion of
forgone output over four years. Second, if recent events are a harbinger of
a significantly more adverse macroeconomic climate than experienced over
the past two decades, then a 2 percent steady-state inflation rate may pro-
vide an inadequate buffer against the ZLB having noticeable deleterious
effects on the macroeconomy, assuming the central bank follows the stan-
dard Taylor rule. In such an adverse environment, stronger systematic
countercyclical fiscal policy, or alternative monetary policy strategies,
or both may be needed to mitigate the harmful effects of the ZLB with a
2 percent inflation target. Even with such policies, an inflation target of
1 percent or lower could entail significant costs in terms of macroeconomic
volatility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I examines the effects of
the ZLB on the U.S. economy during the current episode. Section II
reexamines the assumptions and results of past calculations of the macro-
economic effects of the ZLB under the Taylor rule. Section III evaluates
alternative monetary and fiscal policies designed to mitigate the effects of
the ZLB. Section IV concludes.
I. Lessons from the Current Recession
The ongoing global recession provides compelling proof that the ZLB
can be a significant constraint on monetary policy, with potentially enor-
mous macroeconomic repercussions. This section investigates two ques-
tions regarding the role of the ZLB in the current episode. First, how
should one interpret the widespread phenomenon of central banks lower-
ing their policy interest rates to near zero? Second, what are the conse-
quences of the ZLB in terms of the depth of the recession and the speed
of recovery?
The fact that central banks have found themselves constrained by 
the ZLB should not be surprising; in fact, one of the three main “lessons”
offered by David Reifschneider and Williams (2000) was that central banks
pursuing an inflation goal of around 2 percent would encounter the ZLB
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relatively frequently.2 For example, in a briefing paper prepared for the
Federal Open Market Committee (2002) Reifschneider and Williams find
that with a 2 percent inflation target, roughly in line with the practices of
many major central banks, a calibrated version of the Taylor rule (1993) hits
the ZLB about 10 percent of the time in simulations of the Federal Reserve
Board’s FRB/US macroeconometric model. Given that inflation has been
centered around 2 percent in the United States since the mid-1990s, it was
fully predictable that the ZLB would at some point become an issue—
either as a threat, as in 2004, or as a reality, as it is today.
Indeed, the fact that many central banks have already run up against the
ZLB is evidence that they have learned a second lesson from recent
research, namely, that policymakers should not shy away from the ZLB,
but should instead “embrace” it. A common theme in that research is that
when the economy weakens significantly or deflation risks arise, the cen-
tral bank should act quickly and aggressively to get interest rates down, 
to maximize the monetary stimulus in the system when the economy is
weakening. “Keeping your powder dry” is precisely the worst thing to do.
Figure 4 shows nominal and ex post real rates on short-term Treasury secu-
rities going back to the 1920s. Despite a low rate of inflation and three
recessions, nominal interest rates did not once approach the ZLB in that
decade. That the ZLB appears to be a greater problem today than in the
1950s and early 1960s, when inflation was also low, may reflect “better”
monetary policy in the more recent period. Indeed, a comparison of esti-
mated Taylor-type rules covering that period and the more recent past indi-
cates that short-term interest rates were far less sensitive to movements 
in output and inflation during the earlier period (Romer and Romer 2002).
Of course, the U.S. economy and financial system were very different 
50 years ago, so other factors may also explain the differences in interest
rate behavior.
To answer the second question, I conduct counterfactual simulations
of the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model in which the Federal Reserve is
6 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
2. Note that the lower bound on nominal rates does not necessarily equal zero. On
one hand, lowering the rate below some small positive value may generate costly disrup-
tions in money markets and other short-term financing markets. In this case central banks
may choose never to lower rates all the way to zero, making the effective lower bound a
small positive number. On the other hand, a central bank can in principle lower interest
rates below zero by charging interest on reserves. However, there are still limits to how
low interest rates can go, because banks and other agents can choose to hold currency
instead, which yields zero interest less a holding cost κ, equal to the cost of safely storing
and transporting cash. So, instead of a zero bound, there is a −κ lower bound on short-
term rates.
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not constrained by the ZLB.3 These simulations are best thought of as
scenarios where the economy enters the current episode with a higher
steady-state inflation rate, and therefore the Federal Reserve has a larger
interest rate buffer to work with. I consider experiments in which the
Federal Reserve is able to lower the federal funds rate by up to 600 basis
points more than it has. For comparison, Glenn Rudebusch (2009) finds,
based on an estimated monetary policy rule and Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) forecasts, that in the absence of the ZLB the funds
rate would be predicted to fall to about −5 percent. Again, these experi-
ments are not real policy options available to the Federal Reserve. But
they allow me to quantify the effects of the ZLB on the recent trajectory
of the U.S. economy.
In evaluating the role played by the ZLB, it is important to get the timing
of events right. Private forecasters did not anticipate until very late in 2008
that the ZLB would be a binding constraint on monetary policy. Figure 5
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3. See Brayton and others (1997) for a description of the FRB/US model. In the counter-
factual simulations in this paper, I use the version of FRB/US with vector autoregressive
expectations. In the stochastic simulations used to evaluate alternative policy rules discussed
in sections II and III, I use the version of FRB/US with rational expectations.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system, tabel H.15, “Selected Interest Rates,” 
various issues; Bureau of Labor Statistics data; author’s calculations.
a. From January 1922 to December 1930, rate on short-term Treasury securities; after December 1930, 
rate implied by the auction high on three-month Treasury bills. Shaded bands indicate recessions.
b. Nominal rate minus the change in the headline CPI over the preceding 12 months.
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Figure 4. Interest Rates on Treasury Bills, 1922–2009a
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uses the consensus forecast reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts to
show the expected path of the federal funds rate at various points in 2008
and 2009. At the beginning of September 2008—right before the failure of
the investment bank Lehman Brothers and the ensuing panic—forecasters
did not expect the funds rate to fall below 2 percent. It was not until early
December 2008, when the full ramifications of the panic became clear, that
forecasters came to anticipate a sustained period of rates below 1 percent, and
the ZLB clearly came into play. In fact, the FOMC cut the target funds rate
from 1 percent to a range of zero to 1⁄4 percentage point on December 16,
2008. A similar pattern is seen in forecasts of policy rates in other major
industrial economies, whose central banks made their final rate cuts in
December 2008 or in 2009.
The preceding argument is based on evidence from point forecasts,
which typically correspond to modal forecasts. But in theory, economic
decisions depend on the full distribution of the relevant forecasts, not just
the mode. The possibility that the ZLB could bind in the future may have
introduced significant downward asymmetry in forecast distributions of
output and inflation in late 2008. Such an increase in the tail risk of a severe
recession could have caused households and businesses to curtail spending
more than they would have if the ZLB had not been looming on the horizon.
Although the evidence is not definitive, forecasts in late 2008 do not appear
8 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
Sources: Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, various issues; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, table H.15, “Selected Interest Rates,” various issues.
a. Faded lines are Blue Chip forecasts as of the indicated date.











Figure 5. Federal Funds Rate, Actual 2003–08 and Forecast 2008–11a
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to provide much support for such a channel. Prices for binary options on
the federal funds target rate indicate that even as late as early November
2008, market participants placed only about a 25 percent probability on a
target rate of 50 basis points or lower in January 2009.4 In addition, the
distribution of forecasts for real GDP growth in 2009 from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF) in the fourth quarter of 2008 does not dis-
play obvious signs of asymmetric downside risks.
In summary, the available evidence suggests that through late 2008,
that is, until the ramifications of the financial panic following the failure
of Lehman Brothers were recognized, forecasters did not view the ZLB
as a binding constraint on policy. Therefore, it is unlikely that it had a
significant impact on the major industrial economies before that time,
outside Japan. Importantly, this is the period in which these economies
were contracting most rapidly. According to monthly figures constructed
by Macroeconomic Advisers, the period of sharply declining real U.S.
GDP ended in January 2009, with declines of 2 percent in December
2008 and 0.7 percent in January 2009. Real GDP was roughly flat from
January through July 2009.
Since early 2009, however, the ZLB has clearly been a constraint on
monetary policy in the United States and abroad. Interestingly, forecasters
and market participants expect that the ZLB will pose a relatively short-
lived problem outside Japan. The dashed extensions of the lines in figure 1
show market expectations of overnight interest rates derived from interest
rate futures contracts as of September 2009. At that time market partici-
pants expected major central banks except the Bank of Japan to start rais-
ing rates by early 2010. As shown in figure 5, the Blue Chip forecasters
have likewise consistently predicted that the Federal Reserve would start
raising rates after about a year of near-zero rates. Even those forecasters
in the bottom tail of the distribution of the Blue Chip panel expected the
ZLB to constrain policy for only about a year and a half. Based on these
expectations that central banks will raise rates relatively soon, one might
be tempted to conclude that the effects of the ZLB have been relatively
modest. Arguing against that conclusion is the fact that four quarters is the
mean duration that the ZLB constrained policy in the model simulations
with a 2 percent inflation target reported in Reifschneider and Williams
(2000), and that even such relatively brief episodes can inflict costs on the
JOHN C. WILLIAMS 9
4. See Carlson, Craig, and Melick (2005) for a discussion of the methodology of com-
puting probabilities from option prices.
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5. Because the SPF does not provide a forecast for the federal funds rate, I use its fore-
cast for the three-month Treasury bill rate as a proxy. In addition, the SPF does not report
quarterly figures for 2011 and 2012. I therefore interpolate quarterly figures based on annual
figures for those years and the multiyear forecasts for PCE inflation.
6. It can be argued that monetary policy may be more or less effective than usual in the
current environment, but there is little empirical evidence to guide any modifications of the
model.
macroeconomy. Moreover, these forecasts of the path of interest rates may
prove inaccurate.
I construct my counterfactual simulations starting from a baseline fore-
cast set equal to the August 2009 SPF forecast (Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia 2009). The baseline forecast and the counterfactual simula-
tions for short-term interest rates, the unemployment rate, and inflation
(as measured by the core price index for personal consumption expen-
diture, PCE) are shown in figure 6.5 The SPF foresees the unemploy-
ment rate remaining above 7 percent through 2012 and core PCE inflation
remaining below the median value of the FOMC’s long-run inflation fore-
casts of 2 percent through 2011. Interestingly, this forecast has the core
inflation rate rising over 2010–11, despite continued high unemployment.
Such a forecast is consistent with a Phillips curve model of inflation in
which inflation expectations are well anchored around 2 percent (Williams
2009). Note that these forecasts incorporate the effects of the fiscal stimu-
lus and unconventional monetary policy actions taken in the United States
and abroad.
I consider three alternative paths for the nominal federal funds rate and
examine the resulting simulated values of the unemployment rate and the
core PCE inflation rate. Given the evidence presented above that the ZLB
was not a binding constraint until the very end of 2008, I assume in these
counterfactual scenarios that additional nominal rate cuts of 200, 400, and
600 basis points occur in 2009Q1. I assume that the entire additional cut
occurs in that quarter and that rates are held below the baseline values
through 2010Q4, after which the short-term nominal rate returns to its base-
line (SPF forecast) value. I assume no modifications of the discretionary
fiscal policy actions and unconventional monetary policy actions that are
assumed in the baseline forecast. I further assume that the monetary trans-
mission mechanism works as predicted by the FRB/US model; that is, that
the disruptions in the financial sector do not change the marginal effect of
the additional rate cuts.6 Admittedly, these are strong assumptions, but I do
not see better alternatives.
10 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
11941-01_Williams_rev.qxd  1/26/10  11:07 AM  Page 10
JOHN C. WILLIAMS 11




With 2 percentage points
lower nominal funds rate
With 4 percentage points




2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012













With 2 percentage points
lower nominal funds rate
With 4 percentage points









With 2 percentage points
lower nominal funds rate
With 4 percentage points






Figure 6. Baseline Federal Funds Rate Forecast and Counterfactual Simulations,
2008–12
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I evaluate the simulated outcomes using a standard ad hoc central bank
loss function of the form
where π is the core PCE inflation rate, u is the unemployment rate, and u*
is the natural rate of unemployment. The inflation goal is assumed to be
2 percent. The SPF forecast runs only through late 2012, so I cannot extend
the calculation of the loss beyond that point, nor can I use the optimal
control techniques developed by Lars Svensson and Robert Tetlow (2005).
Table 1 summarizes the outcomes for the baseline forecast and the alter-
native policy simulations. The first four columns report the central bank
loss for different weights λ on unemployment stabilization and different
values for the natural rate of unemployment assumed in the loss function.7
These values for the natural rate cover the range of recent estimates. For
example, the median estimate in the most recent SPF survey was 5 per-
cent, and the highest reported estimate was 6 percent. Justin Weidner and
Williams (2009) provide evidence suggesting that the output gap is smaller
than standard estimates. After taking into account the historical relation-
ship between the output gap and the unemployment gap, they calculate
an average estimate of the output gap that suggests that the natural rate of
unemployment may currently be as high as 7 percent. The final two columns
of table 1 report the simulated values of the unemployment and inflation
rates at the end of the forecast period (2012Q4).
Cutting the federal funds rate by an additional 200 basis points (second
row of table 1) speeds the pace of economic recovery relative to the baseline
forecast, bringing the unemployment rate to near 61⁄2 percent by the end of
2012. Meanwhile the reduction in slack and the lower exchange value of
the dollar cause core price inflation to rise more quickly back to 2 percent.
In fact, core inflation slightly overshoots 2 percent by the end of 2012. This
policy reduces the central bank loss function by a considerable amount
for all combinations of parameters reported in the table. In the baseline
forecast, inflation is below target for nearly the entire forecast period, and
the unemployment rate is consistently above the natural rate, so the added
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7. Note that I assume the same baseline forecast independent of the value of the natural
rate of unemployment used in computing the central bank loss. That is, I treat the natural rate
as an unobservable variable that underlies the baseline forecast. In particular, I do not consider
alternative baseline forecasts predicated on alternative views of the natural rate.
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200 basis points of rate cuts moves both objective variables closer to target.
Only in the final few quarters of the simulation do trade-offs materialize.
Policy would need to be tightened at some point to bring inflation back down
to 2 percent. Of course, in all cases the appropriate path for policy in 2012
and beyond depends on the natural rate of unemployment and the path of
the economy in later years.
The second simulation, which assumes 400 basis points of easing relative
to baseline, is more effective at bringing the unemployment rate down and
inflation closer to the assumed 2 percent target over most of the forecast
period. This policy yields a much lower central bank loss for all parameter
combinations reported in the table. The results are striking. Even when the
sole objective is the stabilization of inflation (λ = 0), an additional 400 basis
points of easing is called for. When the central bank also cares about stabi-
lizing unemployment around its natural rate (λ = 1.0), 400 basis points
of easing reduces the central bank loss even with a 7 percent natural rate of
unemployment.
The third simulation of 600 basis points of easing relative to baseline
yields mixed results. It results in a smaller loss over the simulation period as
long as the natural rate of unemployment is below 7 percent. But it accom-
plishes this at the cost of an inflation rate that is 1⁄2 percentage point above
the assumed target at the end of 2012. Given these results, such a sharp
reduction in rates would be beneficial only if the natural rate of unemploy-
ment is not much higher than 5 percent and if it were followed by a much
sharper increase in interest rates in 2011 and 2012 than assumed in the
simulation.
Based on these results, a compelling case can be made that at least an
additional 400 basis points of rate reduction in early 2009 would have been
beneficial in terms of stabilizing inflation around a 2 percent target, and
unemployment around its natural rate. The cost of the ZLB in this episode
can be measured as the difference in real output between the baseline
forecast and the alternative simulation of an additional 400 basis points of
rate cuts. In that simulation, real GDP averages about 3 percent above the
baseline forecast over 2009–12 (the unemployment rate averages about
1 percentage point below baseline over this period). An additional 4 per-
centage points of monetary stimulus thus yields a total increase in output
over these four years of about $1.8 trillion. This translates into an increase
in output per capita totaling about $5,700 over these four years. The implied
increase in consumption is about 2 percent, on average, which translates
into a total increase in consumption per capita of about $2,700 over the
same period. (These calculations ignore any additional effects on output
14 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
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outside the forecast window.) By any measure, these are sizable losses from
the ZLB and much larger than standard estimates of the cost of business
cycle fluctuations.8
A final caveat is in order. A notable feature of these alternative scenarios
is that they entail sizable negative real interest rates for two years. In the
second alternative scenario of a 400-basis-point reduction in interest rates,
the real funds rate averages below −5 percent during 2009 and 2010. As
shown in figure 4, there have been few peacetime episodes of large, sus-
tained negative real interest rates. Although clearly helpful from the per-
spective of stimulating the economy, such a lengthy period of very negative
real rates could have harmful unintended consequences, such as fueling
another speculative boom-and-bust cycle (see, for example, Taylor 2007).
II. Reexamining the Lessons from Research
These simulations illustrate the large costs associated with the ZLB in
the current situation. However, if this recession represents a unique, extra-
ordinary incident, it has no implications for the choice of inflation goal or
design of a policy rule regarding the ZLB. Indeed, a third “lesson” from
Reifschneider and Williams (2000) is that only in rare instances will the ZLB
be very destructive to the macroeconomy, requiring fiscal or other policies
to avoid a complete economic collapse. The recent episode—characterized
by reckless risk taking on a global scale, poor risk management, lax regu-
latory oversight, and a massive asset bubble—may be such a 100-year flood.
Alternatively, this episode may have exposed some cracks in the analysis
of the ZLB’s effects on the ability of central banks to achieve their macro-
economic stabilization goals. In this section I review some key assumptions
from the literature and conduct “stress tests” of past research, applying
lessons from the past few years.
The magnitude of the welfare loss owing to the ZLB depends critically
on four factors: the model of the economy, the steady-state nominal interest
rate buffer (equal to the sum of the steady-state inflation rate, π*, and the
steady-state, or “equilibrium,” real interest rate, r*), the nature of the distur-
bances to the economy, and the monetary and fiscal policy regime. Recent
events have challenged a number of assumptions regarding the structure of
the macroeconometric models used in past research on the ZLB. Eventually,
JOHN C. WILLIAMS 15
8. The current episode, as projected by the SPF forecast, is an outlier in both depth and
duration compared with earlier post–World War II recessions. But as argued in this paper,
the ZLB has played a key role in this outcome, a situation that has not occurred since the
Great Depression.
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9. Beyond the need for better models of financial frictions, the global nature of the crisis
has important implications for the effects of the ZLB and the ability of monetary policy to
stabilize the economy (Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri 2009).
new models will emerge from the experience of the past few years, but for
now I am limited to the models that exist.9 Because the effects of the ZLB
depend on the extent of nominal and real frictions (Coenen 2003) and the
full set of shocks buffeting the economy, quantitative research into the
effects of the ZLB is best done with richer models that incorporate such
frictions. For this reason, in this paper I use the Federal Reserve Board’s
FRB/US model for my analysis, rather than a small-scale stylized model.
One critical aspect of model specification is the assumption that inflation
expectations remain well anchored when the ZLB is binding. As discussed
in Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and in George Evans, Eran Guse, and
Seppo Honkapohja (2008), if inflation expectations are not anchored, the
ZLB could give rise to a calamitous deflationary spiral, with rising rates of
deflation sending real interest rates soaring and the economy into a tailspin.
In the event, inflation expectations have been remarkably well behaved in
all major industrial economies. The dashed extensions of the lines in figure 3
show consensus forecasts of overall inflation in several countries. Despite
the severity of the downturn, forecasters expect inflation rates to bounce
back over this year and next. Long-run inflation expectations in these coun-
tries, shown in figure 7, have also been very stable over the past several
years, despite the large swings in commodity prices and the severe global
recession. Thus far, at least, inflation expectations appear well anchored.
But there remains a risk that they could become unmoored, in which case
the ZLB poses a larger threat.
A second key assumption is the steady-state real interest rate, which,
along with the steady-state inflation rate, provides the buffer for monetary
policy actions to stabilize the economy. A worrying development over the
past decade is the decline in real interest rates. In the United States, the
long-run average of the real interest rate—defined as the nominal federal
funds rate less the PCE inflation rate—is about 21⁄2 percent, the figure used
by Reifschneider and Williams (2000). But the Kalman filter estimate of the
equilibrium real interest rate, using the Laubach and Williams (2003) model,
has fallen to about 1 percent, as shown in figure 8. Other time series–based
estimates show similar or even larger declines. For example, the trend real
interest rate computed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (with a smoothing
parameter of 1600) was around zero in the second quarter of 2009.
As shown in figure 8, the decline in the Kalman filter estimate of the
equilibrium real interest rate coincided with the recent severe downturn
16 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
11941-01_Williams_rev.qxd  1/26/10  11:07 AM  Page 16
JOHN C. WILLIAMS 17












2003 2007200620052004 2008 2009200220012000
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, table H.15, “Selected Interest Rates,” 
various issues; Bureau of Economic Analysis data; author’s calculations.













Figure 7. Long-Run Inflation Expectations in Major Industrial Countries, 
2000–April 2009
Figure 8. Estimates of Equilibrium Real Short-Term Interest Rates, 1975–2009
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and may prove to be an overreaction to it. This hypothesis receives some
support from prices of inflation-indexed Treasury securities. Evidently,
investors expect real interest rates to remain low over the next five years
but to be closer to historically normal levels thereafter. Nonetheless, the
massive loss in wealth and high levels of household debt both in the United
States and abroad could cause a sizable increase in private saving (Glick
and Lansing 2009). All else equal, such an increase in saving would imply
that the steady-state real interest rate will remain low for some time. Based
on this evidence, a reasonable point estimate of the steady-state real fed-
eral funds rate is about 21⁄2 percent, but the risk is real that it could be as
low as 1 percent. Of course, the steady-state real rate could be higher than
21⁄2 percent, possibly owing to large fiscal deficits in the United States and
abroad (Laubach 2009). In that case the effects of the ZLB would be cor-
respondingly muted.
The third key assumption concerns the nature of future disturbances
to the economy. Because the ZLB affects events in the lower tail of the
distribution of interest rates, the distribution of shocks is a critical factor
determining its effects. Reifschneider and Williams (2000; FOMC 2002)
based their analysis on the covariance of estimated disturbances from the
mid-1960s through the mid-1990s. Other research is based on disturbances
from the period of the Great Moderation from the early 1980s on (Coenen,
Orphanides, and Wieland 2004; Adam and Billi 2006; Williams 2006).
Recent events hint that what were once thought to be negative “tail” events
may occur frequently, and that the period of the Great Moderation may
suggest an overly optimistic view of the future macroeconomic landscape.
Given the limited number of observations since the start of the financial
crisis, one cannot yet ascertain whether these events represent a sustained
break from the past behavior of disturbances.
Given the great deal of uncertainty—much of it difficult or even impos-
sible to quantify—regarding the future economic environment, I take a
minimax approach to evaluating policies. Specifically, I look for policies
that perform well in very adverse or “worst-case” scenarios as well as in
the baseline scenario. I take the baseline scenario to be a steady-state real
interest rate of 21⁄2 percent, and I consider disturbances drawn from a
joint normal distribution based on model disturbances from 1968 to 2002.
I consider alternative adverse scenarios characterized by a steady-state real
interest rate of 1 percent and disturbances drawn from more adverse dis-
tributions. Of course, these two sources of uncertainty represent only a slice
of the spectrum of uncertainty relevant for the ZLB. By taking worst cases
from these two sources, my aim is to provide insurance against a wide
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variety of other forms of uncertainty, including model misspecification and
unanchored inflation expectations.
I follow the simulation methodology of Reifschneider and Williams
(2000), with two relatively minor modifications. First, the simulation results
reported here are based on a more recent vintage of the FRB/US model from
2004. Second, following Athanasios Orphanides and others (2000) and
Reifschneider and Williams (FOMC 2002), I assume that the output gap
included in the monetary policy rule is subject to exogenous, serially cor-
related mismeasurement. The estimates of the simulated moments are based
on two sets of stochastic simulations, encompassing 25,000 years of simu-
lated data.10 The use of such extremely long simulations provides reasonably
accurate estimates of model-implied moments, effectively eliminates the
effects of initial conditions, and ensures that rare events will occur in the
simulations. Finally, I assume that automatic stabilizers and other endoge-
nous responses of fiscal variables behave as usual, but that discretionary
fiscal policy is not used except in extreme downturns.
In what follows, unless otherwise indicated, monetary policy is assumed
to follow a Taylor-type policy rule of the form
where it is the nominal interest rate, r t* is the steady-state real interest rate,
π–t is the four-quarter percent change in the PCE price index, π* is the infla-
tion target, and yt is the output gap.11 Following Orphanides and Williams
(2002), I refer to the specification with ϕ = 0.5 as the “classic” Taylor
(1993) rule; I refer to other specifications as “Taylor-type” rules.
The simulated outcomes are evaluated using a slightly different central
bank loss function from that used earlier, of the form
where π is the overall PCE inflation rate, i* = π* + r* is the unconditional
mean of the nominal short-term interest rate, and E denotes the unconditional
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10. In the analyses using disturbances following the t distribution, I conduct twice as
many simulations as in the analyses using normally distributed disturbances.
11. I have included an upward bias in the notional inflation target in the policy rule that
is needed for the inflation rate to equal the true target level. As discussed in Reifschneider
and Williams (2002) and Coenen, Orphanides, and Wieland (2004), the asymmetric nature
of the ZLB implies that the inflation rate will on average be lower than the inflation target in
the rule. This upward bias is larger, the more the ZLB constrains policy. I correct for this
downward bias by adjusting the inflation target in the policy rule.
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expectation. Note that I consider only the costs of inflation variability and
not the costs of steady-state inflation, on the grounds that current under-
standing of the costs of steady-state inflation is very limited.12 Thus, I stop
short of finding optimal inflation targets. I return to the issue of the costs of
steady-state inflation briefly in the concluding section.
The top panel of table 2 reports the simulated outcomes under the
classic Taylor rule, assuming the shocks are drawn using a normal distri-
bution from the covariance matrix computed from the full sample of dis-
turbances (1968–2002). In terms of the model simulations, the key statistic
is the nominal interest rate buffer, which equals the sum of the steady-state
inflation rate and the steady-state real interest rate. The first two columns
list steady-state inflation rates corresponding to alternative values of r*
of 21⁄2 percent (the baseline scenario) and 1 percent, respectively. The third
and fourth columns report, for each of these combinations of steady-state
inflation and interest rates, the share of the time that the nominal federal
funds rate is below 0.1 and 1 percent, respectively. The fifth column reports
for each combination the share of the time that the output gap is below 
−4 percent, representing the trough of a major recession of the type that
has occurred in 1958, 1975, 1982–83, and 2009. (For comparison, over
1955Q1–2009Q2, the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of the output
gap was below −4 percent about 6 percent of the time.) The sixth through
eighth columns report the corresponding standard deviations of the output
gap, the PCE inflation rate, and the nominal federal funds rate. The final
column reports the central bank loss.
In the baseline scenario, if policy follows the classic Taylor rule, then the
ZLB has only minor effects on the magnitude of macroeconomic fluctua-
tions if the inflation target is 11⁄2 percent or higher. Under these assumptions,
a 11⁄2 percent inflation target implies that the funds rate will fall below 
1 percent 10 percent of the time, and will be below 10 basis points 6 percent
of the time. The standard deviation of the unconstrained funds rate is only
about 21⁄2 percent. So, with a 4-percentage-point buffer, most episodes
where the ZLB is binding are relatively mild, and the effects are minor.
These results are consistent with those of many studies finding that with a
steady-state nominal interest rate of 4 percent or higher, the ZLB has very
modest macroeconomic effects under the Taylor rule.
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12. Alternatively, this approach can be justified by assuming that firms increase prices at
the steady-state inflation rate without incurring adjustment costs (in an adjustment cost model)
or reoptimizing (in a Calvo model).
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If instead the steady-state real interest rate is only 1 percent, then under
the classic Taylor rule a 3 percent inflation objective is still sufficiently
high to avoid most costs from the ZLB. But with a 2 percent inflation
goal, the ZLB binds 13 percent of the time and causes a more noticeable
rise in output gap variability: a rise of 0.3 percentage point relative to an
inflation goal of 5 percent or higher. The incidence of deep recessions
rises as well but remains below 10 percent. Based on this evidence, a
lower steady-state real interest rate argues for a higher inflation goal to
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Table 2. Simulated Outcomes under a Classic Taylor Rule for Different 
Shock Distributions
Annual inflation 
target π* (percent) Percent of the time
Percent of corresponding to the the federal funds 
the time indicated steady-state rate i will be below 
the output Central real interest rate r*a the indicated value
gap will be bank 
r* = 2.5% r* = 1.0% i = 0.1% i = 1.0% below −4% y π i loss Lb
Shocks drawn from 1968–2002 covariance, normal distribution
−0.5 1 23 31 12 3.1 1.5 2.4 13.3
0.5 2 13 20 8 2.8 1.5 2.4 11.5
1.5 3 6 10 6 2.6 1.5 2.5 10.6
2.5 4 4 8 6 2.6 1.5 2.6 10.5
3.5 5 2 3 6 2.5 1.5 2.6 10.1
5.5 7 0 0 5 2.5 1.5 2.6 9.9
7.5 9 0 0 5 2.5 1.5 2.6 9.9
Shocks drawn from 1968–2002 covariance, t distribution with 5 degrees of freedom
−0.5 1 24 33 13 3.1 1.5 2.4 13.2
0.5 2 13 20 8 2.8 1.5 2.5 11.5
1.5 3 8 13 7 2.7 1.5 2.5 10.8
2.5 4 4 7 6 2.6 1.5 2.7 10.6
3.5 5 3 5 6 2.6 1.5 2.7 10.6
5.5 7 0 0 5 2.5 1.5 2.6 9.9
7.5 9 0 0 5 2.5 1.5 2.6 9.9
Shocks drawn from 1968–83 covariance, normal distribution
−0.5 1 29 38 18 3.7 1.7 2.6 18.4
0.5 2 16 23 12 3.3 1.6 2.8 15.5
1.5 3 9 14 11 3.2 1.6 2.8 14.5
2.5 4 4 7 9 3.0 1.6 2.8 13.6
3.5 5 3 6 9 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.4
5.5 7 2 3 8 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
7.5 9 0 0 8 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The monetary policy rule is assumed to be it = max{0, r t* + π– t + 0.5(π– t − π*) + 0.5yt}.
b. L = E{(π − π*)2 + y2 + 0.25* (i − i*)2}, where i* = π* + r*.
Standard 
deviations of the 
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reduce the costs associated with the ZLB. But it alone does not overturn
the basic result of past research that a 2 percent inflation goal is associated
with relatively modest costs from the ZLB. This conclusion is reinforced
when one considers alternative policy rules that mitigate the problems
associated with the ZLB, as discussed below.
As noted above, the assumption of normally distributed disturbances may
understate the likelihood of tail events of the type recently experienced. To
gauge the sensitivity of the results to this assumption, I conduct simulations
where the disturbances have the same covariance as before (that is, based
on the full 1968–2002 sample) but are assumed to follow the t distribution
with 5 degrees of freedom. This distribution is characterized by excess
(relative to the normal distribution) kurtosis of 6; that is, it displays signif-
icantly fatter tails than the normal distribution. For example, the probabil-
ity of a 3-standard-deviation (or greater) event is over four times greater
with this t(5) distribution than with the normal distribution.13
Allowing for a fatter-tailed distribution of disturbances does not materi-
ally affect the results regarding the effects of the ZLB (middle panel of
table 2). The ZLB is encountered slightly more often, and the standard
deviation of the output gap is in some cases higher, but these effects are
nearly lost in rounding. Note that the shocks being considered differ from
those in the other simulations; thus, comparison with the simulations using
normally distributed disturbances is not exact because of the finite samples
of the simulations. Similar results (not reported) were obtained when the
disturbances were assumed to follow a Laplace distribution, which has excess
kurtosis of 3. More exotic distributions with even greater kurtosis may exist
that would have greater effects on these results, but a more critical issue
appears to be the covariance of the shocks, rather than the precise shape of
the distribution.
The effects of the ZLB are far more pronounced when the shocks are
drawn from the pre–Great Moderation period. In the simulations reported
in the bottom panel of table 2, the disturbances are drawn from a normal
distribution where the covariance of disturbances is estimated from the
1968–83 sample. As a result, the ZLB is encountered more frequently and
with greater costs in terms of stabilization of the output gap. With a steady-
state real interest rate of 21⁄2 percent, a 2 percent inflation target is just on the
edge of the region where the ZLB has nontrivial costs in terms of macro-
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13. The choice of 5 degrees of freedom is somewhat arbitrary but near the lower bound
of allowable values for the purpose at hand. In particular, the degrees of freedom of the dis-
tribution must exceed 4 for finite second and fourth moments to exist.
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economic variability. Inflation goals of 11⁄2 percent or lower entail moderate
increases in output gap variability.
The combination of a 1 percent steady-state real interest rate and greater
volatility of disturbances poses the greatest threat to macroeconomic stabi-
lization in a low-inflation environment. In this case inflation goals of 2 to
3 percent are associated with some increase in output gap variability, and a
1 percent goal entails a significant increase. Yet even in these extreme cases,
the effects on inflation variability are quite modest, reflecting the effects of
the assumption of well-anchored expectations.
How big are these losses? One metric is the fraction of the time the output
gap is below −4 percent. In the adverse environment of shocks drawn from
the 1968–83 shock covariance and a steady-state real interest rate of 1 percent,
this figure rises from 9 percent to 18 percent when the inflation target is
reduced from 4 percent to 1 percent. The standard deviation of the output
gap rises by 0.7 percentage point. For comparison, the standard deviation of
the output gap during the Great Moderation period was 2 percentage points,
according to Congressional Budget Office estimates. The comparable figure
for 1965–80 was 2.7 percentage points. Thus, moving from a 4 percent infla-
tion target to a 1 percent target yields an increase in output gap variability in
these model simulations comparable to switching from the Great Moderation
period to the 1965–80 period. Moving from a 4 percent inflation target to a
2 percent target entails an increase in output gap variability comparable to
switching from the Great Moderation period to the period from 1955 to 1965,
when the standard deviation of the output gap was 2.3 percentage points,
or 0.3 percentage point above that during the Great Moderation period.
III. Alternative Monetary and Fiscal Policies
The results reported above indicate that in a particularly adverse macro-
economic environment of large shocks and a low steady-state real interest
rate, the ZLB may cause a significant deterioration in macroeconomic
performance when monetary policy follows the classic Taylor rule with a
very low inflation target. As discussed in Reifschneider and Williams
(2000; FOMC 2002) and Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford (2003),
alternative monetary policy strategies can improve upon the performance
of the classic Taylor rule in a low-inflation environment. Several such mod-
ifications are examined here. In addition, I consider the use of counter-
cyclical fiscal policy to mitigate the effects of the ZLB. Throughout the
following discussion, I assume the worst-case adverse macroeconomic
environment of a 1 percent steady-state real interest rate and disturbances
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drawn from the covariance matrix computed from the shocks of the
pre–Great Moderation period.
III.A. Modifying the Taylor Rule
One way to achieve greater stabilization of the output gap even at low
steady-state inflation rates and in an adverse environment is to have the
policy rule respond more aggressively to movements in the output gap.
Table 3 reports simulation results for alternative values of the coefficient
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Table 3. Simulated Outcomes for Alternative Monetary Policy Responses 
to the Output Gapa
Percent of the time the 
Percent of 
Annual
federal funds rate i 
the time 
inflation





(percent)b i = 0.1% i = 1.0% below −4% y π i Loss Lc
Coefficient on the output gap in the monetary policy rule ϕ = 0.5
1 29 38 18 3.7 1.7 2.6 18.4
2 16 23 12 3.3 1.6 2.8 15.5
3 9 14 11 3.2 1.6 2.8 14.5
4 4 7 9 3.0 1.6 2.8 13.6
5 3 6 9 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.4
7 2 3 8 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
9 0 0 8 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
Coefficient on the output gap in the monetary policy rule ϕ = 1.0
1 34 41 17 4.6 2.1 2.6 27.3
2 16 22 8 3.1 1.7 3.3 15.2
3 11 15 6 2.7 1.6 3.4 13.1
4 8 12 6 2.6 1.6 3.4 12.4
5 6 10 6 2.5 1.6 3.5 12.0
7 2 3 5 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
9 0 1 5 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
Coefficient on the output gap in the monetary policy rule ϕ = 1.5
1 42 49 20 4.9 2.1 3.3 31.2
2 24 30 9 2.9 1.7 3.8 17.1
3 19 24 6 2.6 1.6 4.0 13.4
4 17 22 6 2.5 1.6 4.0 12.8
5 11 15 5 2.3 1.6 4.2 12.5
7 5 7 4 2.3 1.7 4.4 13.0
9 2 3 4 2.3 1.7 4.6 13.2
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. All simulations use shock covariance data for 1968–83 and assume a steady-state real interest rate r*
equal to 1.
b. The monetary policy rule is assumed to be it = max{0, rt* + π– t + 0.5(π– t − π*) + ϕyt}.
c. L = E{(π − π*)2 + y2 + 0.25  (i − i*)2}, where i* = π* + r*.
Standard deviations 
of the output gap y,
inflation π, and the 
federal funds rate i
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on the output gap, ϕ, in the monetary policy rule in equation 2. A larger
response to a widening output gap reduces output gap variability and allows
the central bank to reach output and inflation goals, at some cost of interest
rate variability, even at inflation goals as low as 2 percent. For example,
assume the goal is to have outcomes like those under the classic Taylor rule
(ϕ = 0.5) unconstrained by the ZLB, but with an inflation target of 2 per-
cent. The Taylor-type rule with the stronger response to the output gap of
ϕ = 1.5 yields outcomes for output gap and inflation rate variability close
to those of the unconstrained classic Taylor rule, at the cost of somewhat
greater interest rate variability. Outcomes similar to that of the unconstrained
classic Taylor rule can be achieved with an inflation goal of 3 percent by
setting ϕ = 1.0.
Interestingly, too strong a response to the output gap can be counter-
productive at very low steady-state interest rates. This outcome likely
reflects the asymmetry of the policy response resulting from the ZLB. When
the output gap is positive, policy tightens sharply. But when the output gap
is negative, the policy response may be truncated by the ZLB. This strongly
asymmetric response causes output gap variability to rise at very low infla-
tion rate targets in the adverse macroeconomic environment. A stronger
response to inflation in the Taylor-type rule has little impact on the effects
of the ZLB (not shown).14
None of these modified Taylor rules performs well with an inflation
target of 1 percent in the adverse macroeconomic environment. In all three
cases the standard deviation of the output gap rises sharply, and the fraction
of the time that the output gap is below −4 percent is extremely high,
between 17 and 20 percent. These figures decline dramatically when the
inflation target is raised to 2 percent.
Other modifications to the Taylor-type rule can also be effective at
offsetting the effects of the ZLB in low-inflation environments. The top
two panels of table 4 report the results from a modified Taylor-type rule
proposed by Reifschneider and Williams (2000). According to this policy
rule, realized deviations of the interest rate from that prescribed by the rule
owing to the ZLB are later offset by negative deviations of equal magnitude.
Note that this does not necessarily imply that the central bank is promising
to raise inflation above its target in the future, but only that it makes up for
“lost monetary stimulus” by holding the interest rate low for a period after
the ZLB no longer binds.
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14. There are other reasons, however, for a stronger response to inflation, such as the
better anchoring of inflation expectations in an economy with imperfect knowledge, as
discussed in Orphanides and Williams (2002, 2007).
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This modified rule nearly eliminates the effects of the ZLB for inflation
targets as low as 3 percent, and it significantly reduces them for lower
inflation targets. If the inflation goal is 2 percent, the modified rule with a
greater response to the output gap of ϕ = 1.0 yields the same outcomes as
the unconstrained Taylor rule in this adverse environment.
In rational expectations models like FRB/US, policies with inertial
responses to movements in inflation and output gaps perform much better
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Table 4. Simulated Outcomes for Alternative Monetary Policy Rulesa
Percent of the time the 
Percent of 
Annual
federal funds rate i 
the time 
inflation





(percent) i = 0.1% i = 1.0% below −4% y π i Loss Lb
Classic Taylor rule with lagged adjustment (ϕ = 0.5)c
1 18 26 12 3.7 1.6 2.8 19.4
2 12 19 10 3.2 1.6 2.8 14.7
3 7 13 9 3.0 1.6 2.8 13.6
4 4 8 8 3.0 1.6 3.0 13.7
5 3 5 8 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
7 0 1 8 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
9 0 0 8 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
Taylor-type rule with lagged adjustment (ϕ = 1.0)c
1 32 40 12 3.6 1.6 3.2 27.6
2 21 28 7 2.9 1.6 3.4 13.6
3 16 22 6 2.5 1.6 3.4 11.7
4 5 15 6 2.5 1.6 3.5 11.7
5 2 9 6 2.5 1.6 3.5 11.8
7 0 3 5 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
9 0 1 5 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
Optimized inertial policy ruled
1 24 33 10 3.4 1.4 2.4 14.5
2 15 22 8 2.9 1.4 2.6 11.9
3 11 16 7 2.7 1.4 2.6 11.0
4 5 8 6 2.5 1.4 2.6 10.2
5 2 4 6 2.5 1.4 2.7 10.1
7 0 1 6 2.5 1.4 2.7 10.2
9 0 0 6 2.5 1.4 2.7 10.2
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. All simulations use shock covariance data for 1968–83 and assume a steady-state real interest rate r*
equal to 1. Alternative monetary policies are described in the text.
b. L = E{(π − π*)2 + y2 + 0.25* (i − i*)2}, where i* = π* + r*.
c. The policy rule is as described in Reifschneider and Williams (2000), in which realized deviations of
the interest rate from that prescribed by the rule owing to the ZLB are later offset by opposite deviations
of equal magnitude.
d. The policy rule is iut = 0.96i
u
t−1 + 0.04* (r* + π̂t) + 0.04(π– t − π*) + 0.12yt.
Standard deviations 
of the output gap y,
inflation π, and the 
federal funds rate i
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than static Taylor-type rules and closely approximate the outcomes under
fully optimal policies (Woodford 2003; Levin and Williams 2003). The
key benefit of inertial rules is that they generate expectations of the future
path of policy that reinforce the direct effects of the policy actions on the
economy. Here I examine the performance of an inertial policy rule taking
the form
where itu is the prescription for the federal funds rate unconstrained by the
ZLB. The coefficient on the lagged funds rate, at near unity, imparts a
great deal of inertia to policy (also frequently referred to as “interest rate
smoothing”). The actual setting of the funds rate must satisfy the ZLB:
As shown in Reifschneider and Williams (2000), policy rules like this
perform very well in the presence of the ZLB because they promise to
keep interest rates low in the future and to allow inflation to rise above its
long-run target following bouts of excessively low inflation. In forward-
looking models like FRB/US, this expectation of high future rates of infla-
tion boosts the current rate of inflation.
This inertial policy rule delivers better macroeconomic performance
with a 2 percent inflation target than does the classic Taylor rule uncon-
strained by the ZLB. The bottom panel of table 4 reports the simulated
outcomes from the inertial version of the Taylor-type rule where the
parameters of the rule were chosen to yield minimum weighted variances
of inflation, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate. Nonetheless, in
this worst-case environment there are limits to what this simple rule can
accomplish, and performance suffers noticeably as the inflation goal is
lowered much below 2 percent. I obtain very similar results for a policy
rule that targets the price level growing at a deterministic trend rather
than the inflation rate. (Eggertsson and Woodford 2003 find that such a
rule performs well in the presence of the ZLB.) Price-level targeting
rules are closely related to the inertial rules described above but imply a
stronger mechanism to raise inflation above the long-run target rate fol-
lowing an episode of below-target inflation. Based on this evidence,
there is little gain from switching from an optimized inertial policy to an
explicit price-level targeting regime, even with very low steady-state infla-
tion rates.
( ) max , .5 0i it t
u= { }




t t= + +( ) + −( ) +− π π π 12yt ,
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A potential problem with these alternative policy approaches is that the
public may be confused by monetary policy intentions in the vicinity of the
ZLB. For example, the asymmetric policy rule I have described represents
a significant deviation from the standard reaction function, which could have
unintended and undesirable consequences (Taylor 2007). More generally,
all of these alternative policies rely heavily on expectations of future policy
actions to influence economic outcomes. As shown by Reifschneider and
John Roberts (2006) and by Williams (2006), if agents do not have rational
expectations, episodes of a binding ZLB may distort expectations, reducing
the benefits of policies that work very well under rational expectations. In
particular, inertial and price-level targeting policies cause inflation to rise
above the long-run target following an episode where the ZLB constrains
policy. Such a period of high inflation could conceivably undermine the
public’s confidence in the central bank’s commitment to price stability and
lead to an untethering of inflation expectations. Indeed, central banks are
averse to declaring any desire to see a sustained rise in inflation above the
target level (Kohn 2009; Walsh 2009).
One method to minimize public confusion is for the central bank to clearly
communicate its expectations, including the anticipated policy path, as
discussed by Woodford (2005) and by Rudebusch and Williams (2008).15
Another approach is to back up that communication with interventions
in foreign exchange markets, as proposed by Bennett McCallum (2000),
Svensson (2001), and Günter Coenen and Volker Wieland (2003), or by
targeting the short to the middle end of the yield curve of Treasury securities,
a strategy analyzed by Bruce McGough, Rudebusch, and Williams (2005).
An additional potential problem with highly inertial and price-level
targeting policies is that, historically, the price level and interest rates tend to
be relatively high as the economy enters a recession, because inflation tends
to be high near the end of an expansion.16 In these circumstances, such
policies imply delayed policy responses early in a downturn. The current
episode illustrates this dilemma. As shown in figure 3, inflation had been
consistently running above 2 percent in several countries well into 2008.
Although model simulations do not bear out these concerns, perhaps there
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15. Although a few central banks publish interest rate paths, and the Bank of Canada
recently made clear statements about its intended path, most central banks remain unwilling
to provide such clear communication of their future policy intentions.
16. This observation is related to the strong correlation between the slope of the yield
curve and recessions (Rudebusch and Williams 2009). Past recessions are preceded by periods
of monetary tightening in response to periods of high inflation.
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is something missing from the dynamics in the models or the assumed
monetary policies.
III.B. Countercyclical Fiscal Policy
The active use of countercyclical fiscal policy has been excluded from
consideration in most quantitative research on the ZLB, including the
simulations reported above. The experience of the past decade suggests
that this assumption is too stringent and may overstate the future effects
of the ZLB by ignoring the ways in which fiscal policy can substitute for
monetary policy. The past decade has seen the active use of discretionary
countercyclical fiscal policy in many countries. For example, Japan aggres-
sively used fiscal policy to stimulate the economy during the 1990s and
in the current recession. The International Monetary Fund (2009) expects
discretionary fiscal stimulus to average 1 percent of GDP in the G-20
economies over 2008–10, above and beyond automatic stabilizers and mea-
sures to support the financial sector.
Economic theory is clear that in the presence of nominal rigidities,
government spending can be useful at reducing the macroeconomic costs
associated with the ZLB (see, for example, Eggertsson 2009; Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2009; and Erceg and Lindé 2009). Consider the
case where, following a negative shock to the economy, the short-term
interest rate declines but cannot fall enough to offset the shock. As a result,
the real interest rate rises, consumption falls, and inflation falls. These
consequences reduce household welfare. A temporary increase in govern-
ment purchases will increase output and raise wages and thereby marginal
cost, which in turn boosts both current and expected inflation. Given a fixed
short-term nominal interest rate constrained by the ZLB, the rise in expected
inflation lowers the real interest rate, causing consumption to rise. As a
result, the increase in government spending reduces the fluctuations in
inflation and the output gap and raises welfare.17
In principle, any number of policies aimed at strengthening automatic
stabilizers or countercyclical fiscal policy more generally could help miti-
gate the problems caused by the ZLB. Reifschneider and Roberts (2006),
using simulations of the FRB/US model, provide an example of the effects
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17. In contrast to the case of government spending, the effects of changes in income
taxes when the ZLB is binding can be counterintuitive. In models without credit and liquidity
constraints, lowering income taxes can be counterproductive because it lowers marginal costs
and thus inflation (Eggertsson and Woodford 2006). In such a model, raising taxes during a
downturn can improve welfare. In models with liquidity-constrained consumers, a tax cut
can also raise demand.
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of fiscal policy stimulus when the ZLB is constraining policy. Here I consider
one simple experiment based on a systematic fiscal policy rule for federal
government purchases excluding employee compensation and investment
purchases. The estimated fiscal reaction function for this category of pur-
chases (which make up about half of total purchases) in the FRB/US model
is given by
where g is the logarithm of federal purchases in this category, yt is the
output gap, and i u is the federal funds rate that would occur absent the
ZLB. In the baseline model, γ = 0. I consider the effects of a sustained
increase in federal purchases when the ZLB constrains monetary policy by
setting γ = 0.02. This value implies that a 1-percentage-point interest rate
gap owing to the ZLB causes total federal purchases to rise by 1 percent in
the next period. Lags in fiscal policy implementation are approximated by
the lag structure of this equation.
This modified fiscal reaction function cuts the macroeconomic effects
of the ZLB in half for low steady-state interest rates of 3 and 4 percent.
The bottom panel of table 5 shows the outcomes from this experiment for
the Taylor-type rule with ϕ = 1. The top panel shows the outcome of the
same rule without the fiscal response. In the worst-case scenario, an inflation
target of 3 percent is sufficient to avoid effects from the ZLB. An inflation
target of 2 percent suffers a small increase in output variability. This spec-
ification for the fiscal reaction function is in no way meant to be optimal or
even desirable, but rather is intended only to illustrate the effects of counter-
cyclical fiscal policy aimed at mitigating the effects of the ZLB on the
economy. Further research is needed in this area to devise better counter-
cyclical fiscal policy rules.
III.C. Unconventional Monetary Policy Actions
The preceding discussion and analysis abstracted from unconventional
monetary actions, implicitly assuming that these are not used or are ineffec-
tive. However, the events of the past year provide ample evidence that
central banks possess and are willing to use tools other than the overnight
interest rate. James Clouse and others (2003) and Ben Bernanke and Vincent
Reinhart (2004) describe alternative policy tools available to the Federal
Reserve. In the current crisis, a number of such alternatives have been put
( ) . . . .6 0 55 0 07 0 19 0 0004
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to use. Several central banks, including the Bank of England, the European
Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the Bank of Japan, have instituted
programs to buy or guarantee assets such as commercial paper and mortgage-
backed securities. Finally, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, and the
Federal Reserve have expanded their holdings of longer-term securities
through the creation of reserves. Many of these programs are aimed at
improving the functioning of impaired or distressed markets. Similarly,
the Federal Reserve’s purchases of the debt of government-sponsored
enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and of mortgage-backed
securities, were aimed at particular sectors—housing and finance—that
appeared to be functioning poorly. Future recessions may not be accompa-
nied by severe financial market disruptions, in which case these tools would
not be as useful at offsetting the shock.
An open question is whether policies that expand the central bank’s
balance sheet, such as quantitative easing or purchases of longer-term
JOHN C. WILLIAMS 31
Table 5. Simulated Outcomes of Alternative Fiscal Policiesa
Percent of the time the 
Percent of 
Annual
federal funds rate i 
the time 
inflation





(percent)b i = 0.1% i = 1.0% below −4% y π i Loss Lc
Government does not increase spending when ZLB is reached
2 34 41 17 4.6 2.1 2.6 27.3
3 16 22 8 3.1 1.7 3.3 15.2
4 11 15 6 2.7 1.6 3.4 13.1
5 8 12 6 2.6 1.6 3.4 12.4
6 6 10 6 2.5 1.6 3.5 12.0
8 2 3 5 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
10 0 1 5 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
Government increases spending when ZLB is reached
2 31 39 12 3.9 2.0 2.8 21.2
3 16 23 7 2.8 1.6 3.2 13.3
4 12 17 6 2.6 1.6 3.3 12.2
5 8 12 6 2.5 1.6 3.4 11.8
6 6 10 6 2.5 1.6 3.5 11.9
8 2 3 5 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
10 0 1 5 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. All simulations use shock covariance data for 1968–83 and assume a steady-state real interest rate r*
equal to 1.
b. The monetary policy rule is assumed to be it = max{0, r*t + π– t + 0.5(π– t − π*) + yt}.
c. L = E{(π − π*)2 + y2 + 0.25 * (i − i*)2}, where i* = π* + r*.
Standard deviations 
of the output gap y,
inflation π, and the 
federal funds rate i
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government securities, are effective at stimulating the economy. Bernanke,
Reinhart, and Brian Sack (2004) provide evidence that shocks to the supply
of government securities do affect their prices and yields. Announcements
by the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve regarding plans to buy
longer-term government securities were followed by large movements in
yields, providing additional support that such policy actions can be effec-
tive (see Meier 2009 for a summary of the U.K. experience). Nonetheless,
a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the magnitude and duration of these
effects. In addition, some observers fear adverse consequences from such
actions if taken on a large scale, including the risk of large losses and the
concern that inflation expectations may become unmoored. Further careful
study is needed before these policy options can be counted on as effective
substitutes for more traditional monetary policy actions.
IV. Conclusion
The zero lower bound has significantly constrained the ability of many
central banks to stimulate the economy in the current recession. Counter-
factual simulations suggest that the ZLB will impose significant output costs
on the U.S. economy. Although these simulations focus on the effects of
lower U.S. interest rates on the U.S. economy, comparable simulations for
other economies where the ZLB has constrained monetary policy—such as
Japan and Europe—would no doubt also show that the ZLB has entailed
significant costs during the recent episode. A useful extension of the simu-
lations reported in this paper would be to calculate the costs of the ZLB in
a model of the global economy.
If the recent episode represents a unique, extraordinary incident, it has
no particular implications for future monetary policy with respect to the
ZLB. In particular, a 2 percent inflation target should provide an adequate
buffer for monetary policy in the future. If, however, the era of the Great
Moderation is over but the steady-state real interest rate remains very low,
the ZLB may regularly interfere with the ability of central banks to achieve
macroeconomic stabilization goals. The analysis in this paper argues that
an inflation target of 2 percent may be insufficient to keep the ZLB from
imposing sizable costs in terms of macroeconomic stabilization in a much
more adverse macroeconomic climate if monetary policy follows the stan-
dard Taylor rule.
Given these results, it is important to study and develop monetary and
fiscal policies that effectively counter the effects of the ZLB, should the
future macroeconomic environment prove adverse. Arguably, the applica-
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tion of some of these approaches over the past two years has helped combat
the massive shocks that have buffeted the global economy. Improving these
policies and developing new ones into systematic, predictable responses
to economic conditions will help make them more effective in the future.
In addition, an important lesson from the recent crisis, not addressed in this
paper, is the critical need for effective regulation and supervision of finan-
cial markets to avoid the shocks to the global economy that ignited the
crisis and led to recession.
Finally, this paper has examined only the costs associated with the ZLB,
abstracting from the many other sources of distortions related to steady-state
inflation. Unfortunately, relatively little research has weighed the costs of
the ZLB against these other influences in a coherent, empirically supported
framework (see Billi and Kahn 2008 for a review).18 More research on these
issues is needed.
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18. Much of the literature focuses on the welfare costs related to holding zero-interest-
bearing assets; both Feldstein (1997) and Attanasio, Guiso, and Jappelli (2002) convincingly
show that these are trivial. These costs are even lower now that the Federal Reserve and many
other central banks pay interest on reserves.
11941-01_Williams_rev.qxd  1/26/10  11:07 AM  Page 33
References
Adam, Klaus, and Roberto M. Billi. 2006. “Optimal Monetary Policy under
Commitment with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates.” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 38, no. 7: 1877–1905.
Akerlof, George A., William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry. 1996. “The Macro-
economics of Low Inflation.” BPEA, no. 1: 1–59.
Attanasio, Orazio P., Luigi Guiso, and Tullio Jappelli. 2002. “The Demand for
Money, Financial Innovation, and the Welfare Cost of Inflation: An Analysis
with Household Data.” Journal of Political Economy 110, no. 2 (April): 317–51.
Bailey, Martin J. 1956. “The Welfare Cost of Inflationary Finance.” Journal of
Political Economy 64, no. 2 (April): 93–110.
Benhabib, Jess, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, and Martín Uribe. 2001. “The Perils of
Taylor Rules.” Journal of Economic Theory 96, no. 1–2 (January): 40–69.
Bernanke, Ben S., and Vincent R. Reinhart. 2004. “Conducting Monetary Policy at
Very Low Short-Term Interest Rates.” American Economic Review 94, no. 2
(May): 85–90.
Bernanke, Ben S., Vincent R. Reinhart, and Brian P. Sack. 2004. “Monetary Policy
Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment.” BPEA, no. 2: 1–78.
Billi, Roberto M., and George A. Kahn. 2008. “What Is the Optimal Inflation
Rate?” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review (Second Quar-
ter): 5–28.
Bodenstein, Martin, Christopher J. Erceg, and Luca Guerrieri. 2009. “The Effects
of Foreign Shocks When U.S. Interest Rates Are at Zero.” International Finance
Discussion Papers 983. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (October).
Brayton, Flint, Eileen Mauskopf, David Reifschneider, Peter Tinsley, and John
Williams. 1997. “The Role of Expectations in the FRB/US Macroeconomic
Model.” Federal Reserve Bulletin (April): 227–45.
Carlson, John B., Ben R. Craig, and William R. Melick. 2005. “Recovering Market
Expectations of FOMC Rate Changes with Options on Federal Funds Futures.”
Journal of Futures Markets 25, no. 12 (December): 1203–42.
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. 2009. “When Is the
Government Spending Multiplier Large?” Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau
of Economic Research (October).
Clouse, James, Dale Henderson, Athanasios Orphanides, David H. Small, and
P. A. Tinsley. 2003. “Monetary Policy When the Nominal Short-Term Interest
Rate Is Zero.” Topics in Macroeconomics 3, no. 1, article 12.
Coenen, Günter. 2003. “Zero Lower Bound: Is It a Problem in the Euro Area?” In
Background Studies for the ECB’s Evaluation of Its Monetary Policy Strategy,
edited by Otmar Issing. Frankfurt: European Central Bank.
Coenen, Günter, Athanasios Orphanides, and Volker Wieland. 2004. “Price Stability
and Monetary Policy Effectiveness When Nominal Interest Rates Are Bounded
at Zero.” Advances in Macroeconomics 4, no. 1.
34 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
11941-01_Williams_rev.qxd  1/26/10  11:07 AM  Page 34
Coenen, Günter, and Volker Wieland. 2003. “The Zero-Interest-Rate Bound and the
Role of the Exchange Rate for Monetary Policy in Japan.” Journal of Monetary
Economics 50, no. 5 (July): 1071–1101.
Eggertsson, Gauti B. 2009. “What Fiscal Policy Is Effective at Zero Interest Rates?”
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (August).
Eggertsson, Gauti B., and Michael Woodford. 2003. “The Zero Bound on Interest
Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy.” BPEA, no. 1: 139–211.
———. 2006. “Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Liquidity Trap.” In NBER
International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2004, edited by Richard H. Clarida,
Jeffrey A. Frankel, Francesco Giavazzi, and Kenneth D. West. MIT Press.
Erceg, Christopher J., and Jesper Lindé. 2009. “Is There a Fiscal Free Lunch in
a Liquidity Trap?” Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (April).
Evans, George W., Eran Guse, and Seppo Honkapohja. 2008. “Liquidity Traps,
Learning and Stagnation.” European Economic Review 52, no. 8: 1438–63.
Federal Open Market Committee. 2002. “FOMC Briefing.” Washington: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (January).
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 2009. “Survey of Professional Forecasters,
Third Quarter 2009” (August 14).
Feldstein, Martin. 1997. “The Costs and Benefits of Going from Low Inflation
to Price Stability.” In Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, edited by
Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer. University of Chicago Press.
Glick, Reuven, and Kevin J. Lansing. 2009. “U.S. Household Deleveraging and
Future Consumption Growth.” FRBSF Economic Letter 2009–16. Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco (May 15).
International Monetary Fund. 2009. “The State of Public Finances: Outlook and
Medium-Term Policies after the 2008 Crisis.” Washington (March 6).
Kohn, Donald L. 2009. “Monetary Policy Research and the Financial Crisis:
Strengths and Shortcomings.” Presented at the Federal Reserve Conference on
Key Developments in Monetary Policy, Washington, October 9.
Kuttner, Kenneth N. 2004. “A Snapshot of Inflation Targeting in Its Adolescence.”
In The Future of Inflation Targeting, edited by Christopher Kent and Simon
Guttmann. Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia (November).
Laubach, Thomas. 2009. “New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget
Deficits and Debt.” Journal of the European Economic Association 7, no. 4
(June): 858–85.
Laubach, Thomas, and John C. Williams. 2003. “Measuring the Natural Rate of
Interest.” Review of Economics and Statistics 85, no. 4 (November): 1063–70.
Levin, Andrew T., and John C. Williams. 2003. “Robust Monetary Policy with
Competing Reference Models.” Journal of Monetary Economics 50, no. 5 (July):
945–75.
McCallum, Bennett T. 2000. “Theoretical Analysis Regarding a Zero Lower Bound
on Nominal Interest Rates.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 32, no. 4
(November): 870–904.
JOHN C. WILLIAMS 35
11941-01_Williams_rev.qxd  1/26/10  11:07 AM  Page 35
McGough, Bruce, Glenn D. Rudebusch, and John C. Williams. 2005. “Using 
a Long-Term Interest Rate as the Monetary Policy Instrument.” Journal of
Monetary Economics 52, no. 5 (July): 855–79.
Meier, André. 2009. “Panacea, Curse, or Nonevent? Unconventional Monetary Pol-
icy in the United Kingdom.” IMF Working Paper 09/163 (August). Washington:
International Monetary Fund.
Orphanides, Athanasios, and John C. Williams. 2002. “Robust Monetary Policy
Rules with Unknown Natural Rates.” BPEA, no. 2: 63–118.
———. 2007. “Robust Monetary Policy with Imperfect Knowledge.” Journal of
Monetary Economics 54, no. 5 (July): 1406–35.
Orphanides, Athanasios, Richard D. Porter, David Reifschneider, Robert Tetlow,
and Frederico Finan. 2000. “Errors in the Measurement of the Output Gap and
the Design of Monetary Policy.” Journal of Economics and Business 52, no. 1–2:
117–41.
Reifschneider, David L., and John M. Roberts. 2006. “Expectations Formation
and the Effectiveness of Strategies for Limiting the Consequences of the 
Zero Bound.” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 20, no. 3
(September): 314–37.
Reifschneider, David L., and John C. Williams. 2000. “Three Lessons for Monetary
Policy in a Low-Inflation Era.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 32, no. 4,
part 2 (November): 936–66.
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. 2002. “A Rehabilitation of Mone-
tary Policy in the 1950’s.” American Economic Review 92, no. 2 (May):
121–27.
Rudebusch, Glenn D. 2009. “The Fed’s Monetary Policy Response to the Current
Crisis.” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter 2009–17
(May 22).
Rudebusch, Glenn D., and John C. Williams. 2008. “Revealing the Secrets of the
Temple: The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections.” In
Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, edited by John Y. Campbell. University of
Chicago Press.
———. 2009. “Forecasting Recessions: The Puzzle of the Enduring Power of the
Yield Curve.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 27, no. 4 (October):
492–503.
Svensson, Lars E. O. 2001. “The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof
Way of Escaping from a Liquidity Trap.” Monetary and Economic Studies 19,
no. S-1 (February): 277–312.
Svensson, Lars E. O., and Robert Tetlow. 2005. “Optimum Policy Projections.”
International Journal of Central Banking 1, no. 3 (December): 177–207.
Taylor, John B. 1993. “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice.” Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39: 195–214.
———. 2007. “Housing and Monetary Policy.” In Housing, Housing Finance,
and Monetary Policy: A Symposium Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City. Kansas City, Mo.
36 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
11941-01_Williams_rev.qxd  1/26/10  11:07 AM  Page 36
Walsh, Carl E. 2009. “Using Monetary Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity.”
Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium on
Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policy, Jackson Hole, Wyo.
Weidner, Justin, and John C. Williams. 2009. “How Big Is the Output Gap?” Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter 2009–19 (June 12; updated
September 9, 2009).
Williams, John C. 2006. “Monetary Policy in a Low Inflation Economy with Learn-
ing.” In Monetary Policy in an Environment of Low Inflation: Proceedings of
the Bank of Korea International Conference 2006. Seoul: Bank of Korea.
———. 2009. “The Risk of Deflation.” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Letter 2009–12 (March 27).
Woodford, Michael. 2003. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of
Monetary Policy. Princeton University Press.
———. 2005. “Central-bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness.” In The
Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future: A Symposium Sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Kansas City, Mo.
JOHN C. WILLIAMS 37




MICHAEL WOODFORD This paper by John Williams reassesses the
significance for the choice of an inflation target of a consideration stressed
by Lawrence Summers (1991), namely, that too low a target will inter-
fere with the success of monetary stabilization policy, because policy will
too frequently be constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal inter-
est rates. This argument began to be taken more seriously by both central
bankers and monetary economists after Japan reached the zero bound in
the late 1990s, and I think the consensus view regarding the desirable
level for an inflation target shifted at least slightly higher after that
experience. Many countries had lowered their inflation rates (often in a
series of steps) over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, but it was not
clear whether this process of disinflation should be regarded as having
been completed, or at what point it would be appropriate to stop. Before
the Japanese experience showed that the zero bound could indeed be a
binding constraint, an important current of opinion argued for the desir-
ability of zero inflation (full “price stability”) or even mild deflation (to
reduce the opportunity cost of holding money to zero, as called for by
Friedman 1969). After observing the Bank of Japan’s inability to pull the
Japanese economy out of its continuing deflationary slump over a period 
of years, many economists came to accept that inflation targets on the order
of 2 percent a year—a level already commonplace among the industrial
nations with explicit targets—were quite possibly low enough.
Williams asks, however, whether recent events—in which the Federal
Reserve and a great many other central banks found themselves at the
effective lower bound to which they were willing to reduce their policy
rates, amid a global recession—might not justify a further upward revision
in inflation targets. The question Williams poses is not whether the zero
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lower bound is a reason to forgo the benefits of deflation at the rate called
for by Friedman, or even the benefits of full price stability, but whether
even a 2 percent inflation target does not make the zero lower bound too
great a constraint on effective stabilization policy. After all, central banks
like the Federal Reserve have found themselves constrained by the zero
bound during the current crisis, despite explicit or implicit inflation targets
on the order of 2 percent. The general tenor of the paper’s conclusions is that
it might indeed be prudent to aim for a moderately higher rate of inflation,
perhaps as high as 4 percent a year, which, in the context of U.S. policy,
would mean aiming for a rate clearly higher than that pursued for the past
two decades.
This conclusion contrasts with that reached by Williams himself in his
analyses of the issue only a few years ago (for example, Reifschneider and
Williams 2000; Williams 2006), which represent, in my view, some of
the best work available on this topic. What accounts for the difference?
Williams proposes two reasons in particular for greater caution now about
the suitability of a low inflation target. One is that past studies may have
assumed too low a frequency of large shocks. This is a crucial issue, since
the zero bound is a constraint on interest rate policy only to the extent that
one would sometimes like to be able to cut real interest rates substantially,
and how often that situation arises depends on the size of certain kinds
of real disturbances to the economy. Williams proposes that studies that
parameterize shock processes based on data from the “Great Moderation”
period of the mid- to late 1980s and the 1990s may underestimate the
frequency of large shocks, on the grounds that this period may have been
atypically calm; as a robustness check, he instead conducts stochastic
simulation exercises using a shock distribution estimated on the basis of
data from the period 1968–83 only, so as to exclude the arguably atypical
years that followed.
The other reason for caution is that past studies may have assumed too
high a value for the average equilibrium real rate of interest. This is also a
crucial issue, since the average level of nominal interest rates associated
with a given inflation target—and hence the number of percentage points
by which interest rates can be cut, if necessary, before hitting the zero lower
bound—is greater, the higher the average equilibrium real rate of interest.
Williams cites estimates suggesting that the equilibrium real rate of inter-
est in the United States has fallen in recent years, from a range of 2.5 to
3 percent a year in the 1980s to only about 1 percent at present. If this
represents a permanent structural change, he suggests, it may be appropri-
ate to simulate the consequences of alternative policy rules assuming an
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average equilibrium real rate as low as 1 percent. Both of these proposed
changes in the numerical assumptions used in his stochastic simulations
increase the degree to which the zero bound is predicted to interfere with
economic stabilization, under a Taylor rule with an implicit inflation target
of 2 percent a year.
Although I am sympathetic with the view that it is important to under-
take sensitivity analysis of quantitative conclusions to alternative assump-
tions, especially with regard to the values of parameters about which one
cannot claim that the historical record provides conclusive evidence, it is
difficult to be sure how much weight to place on the results obtained under
Williams’s “worst-case” scenarios (those that use shocks from the period
1968–83 and assume an equilibrium real rate of only 1 percent). One could
also argue, with some plausibility, that 1968–83 was a period of atypically
high macroeconomic instability. (Some of that instability may have been
due to policy mistakes, rather than to genuinely exogenous disturbances
to economic fundamentals, but it may show up as larger residuals in the
equations of the structural model used in Williams’s exercise, owing to
misspecification of some of the model equations. In that case, residuals
of this size should not be expected to be a recurrent feature of economic
dynamics under a stable policy rule that provides a stronger nominal anchor.)
It is even less clear that it makes sense to assume that the equilibrium real
rate of interest will continue to be 1 percent a year. If the equilibrium real
rate has fallen by an entire percentage point (or more) leading up to and
during the current financial crisis (as indicated by the Laubach-Williams
estimates shown in Williams’s figure 8), this is surely due to temporary
disruption of the financial system, rather than some kind of permanent
structural change that happens to coincide precisely in time with the crisis.
Hence, it is plausible to assume that the equilibrium real rate should again
be 2 percent or higher, once the recent problems in the financial sector
have largely been overcome. Other factors that have contributed to a some-
what lower equilibrium real rate of return over the past decade, such as the
remarkable accumulation of dollar assets by Asian central banks, may well
prove temporary as well, leading to an equilibrium real rate of return more
like that observed in past decades.
Even under his worst-case assumptions, Williams’s results provide
modest support at best for an inflation target higher than 2 percent. The
main results that he emphasizes concern the stability of output and inflation
under a “simple” Taylor rule with one implicit inflation target or another;
Williams argues that the greater stability of real activity under an inflation
target of 3 or even 4 percent is sufficient to offset the harm done by the
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higher average rate of inflation under such rules. But as his paper shows,
more sophisticated monetary policy rules could achieve better outcomes,
even with an average inflation rate of 2 percent (or less).
In fact, as stressed by previous papers such as Reifschneider and
Williams (2000) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), a “simple” Taylor
rule is a relatively poor form of policy rule in the case that the zero bound
sometimes binds, because it is a commitment to a purely forward-looking
policy. This means that once the zero bound ceases to bind, monetary policy
is immediately conducted in the same way as it would be if the bound had
not constrained policy. Hence, the central bank’s opportunity to commit
itself to a systematic approach to policy is not used to create expectations
about how policy will be conducted after an episode in which the zero
bound is reached that respond in any way to that situation. In fact, the
advantage of a higher inflation target in the simulations in this paper derives
entirely from the consequences of having people expect a higher inflation
target immediately following the exit from a period in which the zero bound
has been a binding constraint; the expectation of a higher inflation rate at
that time lowers the expected real rate implied by the zero nominal interest
rate floor, and this reduces the distortions caused by the existence of that
floor. But to achieve this benefit, it is (at least in principle) not necessary to
have a higher inflation target all of the time; it suffices to follow a policy
that allows higher inflation for a very brief period following any period in
which the zero bound causes one to undershoot one’s normal target; the
inflation target can still be 2 percent (or even lower) at all other times.
The “history-dependent” policy rules proposed in Reifschneider and
Williams (2000) and in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) serve exactly
this purpose. As long as the fraction of the time in which the zero bound is
a binding constraint is not too large, such rules achieve a substantially higher
level of welfare than any purely forward-looking (or constant-inflation-
target) policy, as shown by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and the
optimal rule involves an average inflation rate that is only slightly higher
than would be optimal if the zero bound were never a constraint. Indeed, it
is not obvious that any increase in the average inflation rate is necessary
in order to deal with the zero lower bound in a reasonably effective way.
Eggertsson and Woodford show, in an admittedly simple model, that a
good approximation to optimal policy can be achieved—and the distor-
tions resulting from the zero bound under a constant inflation target largely
avoided—by a simple price-level targeting rule that implies a zero rate of
inflation over the long run. Under this rule the only commitment to inflation
is a commitment to make up for any decline in the price level that occurs
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during the period in which the zero bound prevents the target from being
hit; this brings about inflation expectations of the size necessary to prevent
the zero bound from creating significant distortions (for if there were more
substantial distortions, the sharper decline in prices would automatically
create correspondingly higher expectations of inflation as soon as inflation
can be achieved with a nonnegative interest rate).
An important question about this solution to the problem of the zero
bound is whether it is likely that such a commitment to subsequent reflation
can actually be made credible to the public, so that inflation expectations are
affected in the desired way. (Walsh 2009 discusses the skepticism of many
central bankers about such proposals.) One might argue that restricting
attention to simple Taylor rules with alternative constant inflation targets is
sensible, on the grounds that more complex rules would not be understood
or believed in. But the kind of commitment that would solve the problem is
not too difficult to explain; as just noted, it would simply require commit-
ment to a price-level target or, more realistically, to a target path for the
price level (or for some other nominal variable, such as nominal GDP).
Moreover, even if one supposes that private sector inflation expectations
cannot be shifted by mere announcements about future policy intentions, it
would be desirable to explicitly analyze the kind of policy that would best
shape those expectations in a way that mitigates the distortions caused by
the zero bound. Williams (2006) addresses this question in the context of
an explicit model of “learning” dynamics and finds that some rules that
would be effective at stabilizing the economy despite the zero bound under
an assumption of rational expectations are less desirable under learning
dynamics. Nonetheless, he finds that “a robust strategy to cope with both
imperfect knowledge and the zero bound is to respond more strongly to
inflation” when not at the zero bound “than would be optimal under ratio-
nal expectations.” Even with learning dynamics, such a rule is found to be
“effective at stabilizing inflation and output . . . even with a low inflation
target” (Williams 2006, abstract).
Another possible response to a perceived inability to make a credible
commitment to history-dependent policy is to use fiscal policy to prevent a
severe contraction and deflation once the zero bound is reached. Under the
assumption that the central bank follows a simple Taylor rule except when
the zero bound is reached, New Keynesian models often imply quite large
output multipliers for increases in government purchases while monetary
policy continues to be constrained by the zero bound (Eggertsson 2009;
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2009). Of course, such a policy
response is not under the control of the central bank. Nonetheless, reliance
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on fiscal policy to mitigate the problems that could otherwise be created
by the zero bound has two advantages: first, that the deviation from policy
as usual is one that can already be observed at the time that one wishes for
the policy to be credible (that is, when the zero bound constrains monetary
policy), and second, that the effectiveness of the policy does not depend on
any change in expectations about how policy will be conducted after the
unusual circumstances cease to obtain. (In fact, the analyses just cited
imply that the output effect of government purchases is greatest when the
public does not expect that the increased government purchases will con-
tinue after the zero bound no longer constrains monetary policy.) Relative
to a policy of creating higher inflation expectations while at the zero bound
by aiming at a higher inflation target all of the time, the alternative of activist
fiscal policy during crises has the advantage of not increasing economic
distortions at other times. This is a substantial advantage if the economy is
not at the zero bound too much of the time.
Finally, even supposing that the relevant choice is among alternative
inflation targets under a simple Taylor rule, with no assistance from fiscal
policy, and even accepting Williams’s worst-case assumptions under which
the policy simulations should be conducted, the quantitative results that
Williams announces do not make all that strong a case for an inflation target
higher than 2 percent. According to the bottom panel of his table 2 (the case
of shocks drawn from the 1968–83 distribution), and under the assumption
that the steady-state real interest rate r* = 1 percent, increasing the inflation
target from 2 percent to 4 percent would lower the standard deviation of
log output from 3.3 percent to 3.0 percent, with no measurable effect (to two
significant digits) on the standard deviations of inflation or interest rates.
But would this degree of improvement in the stability of aggregate output
really justify 2 percentage points higher inflation?
The most serious reason to fear that an increase in the Federal Reserve’s
implicit inflation target to 4 percent could do real harm is the likelihood
that such a shift would increase doubts about the extent to which the Federal
Reserve is truly committed to any inflation target at all: if, as a result of a
recession, the inflation target can be increased from the 1.5 to 2 percent
range that many members of the Federal Open Market Committee were
thought to prefer in the recent past to a target of 4 percent, what further
shifts in the inflation rate might the Federal Reserve find acceptable in
response to further unforeseen events? Such considerations are not taken
into account in Williams’s simulations, which assume perfect constancy and
perfect credibility of whichever inflation target is contemplated. But even
supposing that the consequences would be those indicated in table 2, one
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might easily conclude that 2 percentage points higher inflation at all times
would increase distortions by more than the improved output stabilization
would reduce them.
The “loss measure” reported in table 2 assumes that losses result only
from squared deviations of inflation, output, and the nominal interest rate
from their steady-state values, even though the steady-state values of infla-
tion and of the nominal interest rate are quite different in the equilibria
associated with alternative inflation targets. Thus, the gains reported from
moving from the 2 percent inflation target to a 4 percent target take no
account at all of any reason why a higher average inflation rate (or a higher
average nominal interest rate) would be undesirable. It therefore abstracts
entirely from the considerations that are at the center of most discussions
of the optimal inflation target (as surveyed, for example, in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe 2009). One might easily assign values to those other considera-
tions that would outweigh the improvement in output stabilization shown
in the table.
As a simple example, the familiar Calvo model of staggered price
adjustment implies the existence of losses deriving from the misalignment
of prices that are adjusted at different times that are (in a second-order
approximation to expected utility, as discussed in Woodford 2003, chapter 6)
proportional to E[πt2] rather than to E[(πt − π*)2]. If one assumes that the
losses due to inflation variability are of this sort, then the term E[(πt − π*)2]
in the loss measure (equation 3) should be replaced by
When this substitution is made (but otherwise assuming the relative weights
on the three stabilization objectives given in equation 3), the loss measure
associated with the 2 percent inflation target (in the bottom panel of table 2)
increases from 15.5 to 19.5, while the loss associated with the 4 percent
inflation target increases from 13.6 to 29.6. Hence, the increase in the infla-
tion target would result in substantially greater losses rather than the mod-
est improvement that the table suggests. Indeed, under this correction
the 1 percent inflation target (the lowest considered in the table) would
be the one with the lowest losses. If one were also to take account of the
“shoe-leather costs” resulting from unnecessary economizing on cash
balances, which should be an increasing function of i*, this conclusion
would only be strengthened.
Thus, the case that is presented for the desirability of an inflation target
higher than 2 percent is quite weak. My own summary of Williams’s results
E Eπ π π πt t2 2
2[ ] = + −( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦* * .
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would be that even under assumptions that are chosen to be as unfavorable
as possible to a low inflation target—larger shocks, a very low assumed
value for r*, restriction of attention to simple Taylor rules, and no help
from fiscal policy—stochastic simulations that take into account the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates provide little support for the desir-
ability of an inflation target as high as 2 percent, let alone an even higher
target.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Robert Hall suggested that the literature on
the zero lower bound overlooks the possibility of a negative federal funds
rate. A negative funds rate can be achieved by charging banks for holding
reserves rather than paying interest on them. Then banks would pay each
other to take their unwanted reserves, generating the pressure to lend that
achieves the desired stimulus. Hall argued that economists should encour-
age Congress to permit the Federal Reserve to charge for reserves.
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Christopher Sims observed that the Swedish Riksbank already has a
negative-interest-rate policy, which it implements by charging interest on
reserves. However, there are limits to how far one can push interest rates
into negative territory by this means. Cash pays zero interest, which means
that if the interest rate is negative enough, banks will substitute cash in the
vault for reserve balances and so avoid the negative interest rate. Benjamin
Friedman agreed with Hall that it is just an administrative matter whether the
Federal Reserve charges interest on banks’ accounting balances of reserves.
Moreover, under the right legislation, it would not matter whether the
reserves were held in the form of balances at the Federal Reserve or vault
cash. Both could be charged. Sims responded that although the Federal
Reserve could indeed charge banks interest on vault cash, it cannot charge
interest on cash in general. And so long as there exists an asset (cash) that
pays nonnegative nominal interest, the effective marginal cost of borrowing
cannot be pushed much below zero.
Christopher House noted that the reason that the money supply is not
discussed as a policy instrument in modern monetary models with price
rigidity is that the money demand side of the model can usually be inverted
to express policy in terms of a nominal interest rate. This works as long as
the nominal interest rate is above the lower bound. An alternative way of
conducting monetary policy in such an event would be to focus less on the
federal funds rate, and more on other types of policy instruments. In fact,
House pointed out, the Federal Reserve has been doing some of this already
through quantitative easing.
Vincent Reinhart underscored House’s point by noting that one’s degree
of concern about the zero lower bound depends on one’s assessment of how
effective policy is at the lower bound. He also observed that the treatment
of the inflation goal in Williams’s paper is symmetric, but central bankers
often sound very asymmetric in discussing their inflation goals: shortfalls of
inflation below the target seem to represent evidence of increased credibility,
whereas any excess poses a danger of losing credibility. He wondered what
the right inflation goal is if one believes that central bankers will deal with
departures from it asymmetrically.
David Laibson noted that the paper did not address the effects of down-
ward nominal wage rigidity on the calculation of the optimal inflation rate. He
wondered to what extent the issue is still as relevant as it was when George
Akerlof, William Dickens, and George Perry first brought it to the Panel’s
attention in their 1996 Brookings Paper, or whether it is now considered to
be a second-order issue in light of subsequent research. If the issue is still
important, how does it affect the paper’s analysis? George Perry responded
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that their research indicated that the issue remained relevant as of not very
long ago. They still found an abrupt discontinuity below zero, which made
sense given how labor markets are thought to work. But the Akerlof, Dick-
ens, and Perry results had been subject to an important amendment: they
are relevant to an economy near full employment, not one in deep recession.
Christopher Sims thought the Federal Reserve ought to talk about at
least being willing to tolerate higher inflation than it has previously targeted.
He did not see a price-level target, which Michael Woodford had espoused
in his comment, as a good idea: although it might be attractive in the current
situation because of the zero lower bound, it is not so attractive in a situation
following high inflation, perhaps accompanied by a recession, because then
the price-level target would indicate a need to deflate. What is needed in that
case is to convince the public that the Federal Reserve is willing to tolerate
higher future inflation, and that is not the same as a price-level target.
David Romer highlighted for the Panel what he saw as a striking number
in the paper: $1.8 trillion, which is roughly the cumulated output cost over
the next several years of the zero lower bound, or the difference between
output as currently projected and what output would be with an additional
400 basis points of stimulus. That is a huge number and raises major policy
issues. Romer observed that the academic literature that predated the crisis
gave a clear answer about what policy is supposed to do in this situation: it
should promise temporarily high inflation. He was therefore puzzled, not
by the fact that central bankers have not done that, but by the fact that they
never seemed to seriously consider it. He felt that the view due to Kenneth
Rogoff, that the world needs conservative central bankers, has perhaps been
taken a little too far. Today’s central bankers seem allergic to inflation at
any level and unwilling even to talk about it under any circumstances.
Alan Blinder reminded the Panel that when one is talking about whether
inflation should be 2 or 3 or 4 percent, as opposed to whether it should be
zero or 12 percent, another issue becomes relevant, namely, bias in the
inflation measure. The science of inflation measurement is not at the state
where it can confidently distinguish between zero and 2 percent, or between
2 and 4 percent inflation.
Justin Wolfers felt that the paper’s treatment of the natural rate of
unemployment might understate the situation. Disinflation can easily start
to cause long-term unemployment problems, which can in turn cause the
natural rate to creep upward, resulting in large, persistent output shortfalls.
If there is even a reasonable probability of such an effect, Wolfers asserted,
the magnitudes involved could well swamp just about everything else and
boost the figure of $1.8 trillion.
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Timothy Besley argued that it is premature to try to assess the welfare
implications of the zero lower bound, because so far we have little experi-
ence of periods when interest rates are hitting the bound on a regular basis,
or of how central banks can and will respond. He recalled from his tenure on
the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee that as Britain approached
the zero lower bound, it was clear that there would be a lot of pressure for
some sort of action when the lower bound was reached, but very unclear
what would be done. Monetary policymakers still have a lot to learn about
effective policy at the lower bound, which can only come from experi-
ence. Besley also noted that the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy
becomes more important when one begins to encounter the zero bound
with some regularity, and such coordination could lead to fundamental
changes in the nature of the central bank’s independence.
Richard Cooper observed that the available quantitative information
concerning the lower bound comes overwhelmingly, or even exclusively,
from the United States, yet the paper tries to draw lessons that go well
beyond the United States. More empirical data from other countries are
needed. He supposed that wage rigidity in the United States is less than what
it was two decades ago, and he was unsure whether the same would be true
of other countries. To the extent that wage rigidity is important, one has to
look not only at these macroeconomic phenomena, but also at the allocative
implications of an inflation target, because if nominal wages are rigid, one
can get much more movement in real wages with a higher inflation target.
Christopher Carroll noted that only two or three years ago, before the
dramatic events of recent months, some academic papers had come to
the conclusion that hitting the zero lower bound was essentially a zero-
probability event and could be ignored. Now the zero-probability event has
happened, and the response seems to be “Oh, when you recalibrate with
the new data, it’s not a zero-probability event any more, just rare.” Carroll
wondered whether this reaction is an unhealthy sign that the whole literature
has gone seriously astray and has overestimated the state of knowledge on
some fundamental questions, by requiring that all answers to those questions
be shoehorned into the model through their implications for a couple of
model parameters such as the target inflation rate or the cost of quadratic
inflation deviations. He proposed a return to some more foundational ques-
tions that have not been satisfactorily settled. For example, what are the
costs of inflation, and are they captured in the current models? He thought
Stanley Fischer may have come close to the truth with his idea that the
biggest cost of higher inflation is that it creates more uncertainty, but then
inflation becomes simply an intermediary indicator of uncertainty, in which
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case the real issue becomes the effect of monetary policy on uncertainty,
not on inflation.
Benjamin Friedman commented that the current behavior of central banks
seems to provide dramatic evidence that they are not solely concerned
about rising inflation. With the zero lower bound currently binding, one
would want to have a more negative real interest rate, and yet it is precisely
at this moment that the Federal Reserve seems most eager to demonstrate
that it will seek at all costs to withdraw the excess liquidity in a way that
will not lead to inflation.
Friedman also wondered whether the paper could make the point more
persuasively that hitting the zero lower bound did not make the current
recession any deeper. The claim, as he understood it, was that the zero
lower bound could not have contributed to the precipitous decline in GDP
in the first quarter of 2009, because of the usual lags with which monetary
policy affects the economy. But in light of the role that expectations play,
more justification is needed to say that there was no difference between, on
the one hand, the Federal Reserve cutting the funds rate to zero and telling
the public that it was through, and on the other, the Federal Reserve making
very clear that it was willing to do whatever was required to prop up the
economy.
Ricardo Reis commented that the value of an inflation target is as a means
of conveying the central bank’s commitment to a given level of inflation, so
that agents come to expect that level of inflation in their pricing and output
decisions. Just five years ago, when the optimal inflation target was being
discussed, there was agreement that it should be between around zero and
2 percent. No one was seriously proposing 4 percent. Now, however, the
discussion is whether it should be 2 or 4 or maybe even 5 percent. It seemed
to Reis that when the economy gets into serious difficulty, the discussion
turns to exit strategies, and higher targets suddenly become acceptable.
But he worried that once out of the crisis, those higher rates would again
become laughable and the discussion would return to lower rates. There
thus seemed to be a disconnect in the current discussion: as long as the target
itself is being reassessed every few years, it undermines the commitment
that justifies the desire for a target in the first place.
Gita Gopinath reminded the panel of another policy option available to
policymakers confronting the zero lower bound, namely, depreciating the
currency. This was raised by Ben Bernanke during the Japanese deflation
but seldom comes up in other contexts. There are some reasons why this is
so, but perhaps depreciation should be discussed as one of the ways of
dealing with the lower bound.
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